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K A R E N  V I R A G  
A friend and colleague, Evgenia Stoyanova, recently spent time working 
for the UN in Ukraine. She told me about a dance performance she 
attended while in Kiev: 
It was a spectacular show put on by the National Ballet of Ukraine for 
Yushenko's inauguration (Virski), a modern ballet with Ukrainian folk motifs, 
and it involved a dance where a communist statue (with the workers, soldiers, 
the red star, the cannon, the whole deal) comes to life and all the characters tell 
their story. It is a magnificent piece of art. Amazing to watch! Look at the irony, 
though. It was a commemoration to all those heroes of the past (the proletariat 
who built socialism) at the inauguration of Yushenko, who was to be the first 
Ukrainian president to lead Ukraine to a new era of true independence from 
Russia. 
These images of granite socialist realist statues doing Cossack squat 
thrusts dancing through my head seems a perfect point of departure for a 
discussion of socialist realist art, Budapest’s open air museum of 
communism, the Statue Park, and a kind of companion museum, the 
House of Terror.  
 
S O C I A L I S T  R E A L I S T  A R T ,  O R  T H E  P E R F E C T I B I L I T Y  O F  
T H E  F U T U R E .  A S  I F .   
Public art and monuments reflect important aspects of a people’s identity 
or fundamental beliefs or aesthetic sensibilities. Monuments such as 
statues are “messages of power” (Boym 89), and they are meant to last a 
long time, thereby bridging the gap of generations by embodying 
unifying myths. Destroying such objects disrupts collective identity and 
is an effective way for one group to assert domination over another. The 
concerted wholesale destruction of public images by governments has 
many precedents, as exemplified by Lenin’s 1918 announcement under 
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what must be one of the longest headlines in the history of journalism: 
“The Removal of Monuments Erected in Honour of the Tsars and Their 
Servants and the Production of Projects for Monuments to the Russian 
Socialist Revolution.” In his announcement, Lenin noted that he wanted 
to put the unemployed to work toppling the old tsarist statues and 
erecting new ones to celebrate such revered figures as Marx, Engels, 
Robespierre, Spartacus, Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, Chopin and Byron (Clark 
79). Lenin wanted to convey the notion that the ethos of art was 
education, so each new politically correct statue would bear a plaque 
with a brief biography and history lesson to educate the masses. To all 
accounts, Lenin allowed sculptors surprisingly free rein, which 
encouraged public discussions about art. Things did not stay rosy for 
too long, though. As art historian Toby Clark (1997) tells us, “This 
relative freedom and the modest scale of the statues contrasts with the 
later conformity of Stalinist monumentalism though Lenin’s plan would 
be cited as a precedent for the monstrous statues of political leaders.” 
And indeed, in 1934, Stalin formally defined and prescribed 
socialist realism as the official aesthetic of the Soviet Union, and such 
aesthetic prescriptions and proscriptions would be imposed on 
communist states throughout the world, including Hungary, which 
became part of the Soviet area of influence when, following a short 
period of democracy in 1946–1947, Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi 
established a Stalinist rule in the country. This led, among other things, 
to the adoption of socialist realist art as a principal style of artistic 
production. And I say production not representation because socialist 
realism is essentially an “officially sanctioned way of making the world 
(available)” (Rév 2005, 263) rather than a mode of representation, and 
the sanctioning power to represent in this case belonged to the 
Communist Party, which felt that art must be based on four principles: it 
must reflect people’s concerns; class consciousness; the Party’s views, 
and it must be current (Clark 87). 
This is all fine and good, but the regime had a problem on its hands – 
how to handle the divide between art as “high culture” and the generally 
plebeian tastes of the common worker, who would rather go to a soccer 
match than an art gallery. “The solution was to merge fine art with mass 
culture, first, with the mass reproduction of paintings and sculptures in 
films, postcards, advertisements and magazines, which shift the sites of 
reception and confer a sense of common ownership over the image, and 
second, by the stylistic adaptation of art to the visual codes of popular 
culture — by making a painting look like a movie poster, for example 
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(Clark 61). The result is kitsch, a German word that refers to mass-
produced art or artifacts that are somehow inferior, pretentious, trite, or 
in bad taste, as in prints of poker-playing dogs.  
 
A T  T H E  S T A T U E  P A R K ,  C A P I T A L I S M  M E E T S  
C O M M U N I S M  A N D  P U L L S  I T S  P A N T S  D O W N  I N  F R O N T  
O F  E V E R Y B O D Y  
In December of 2003, Pál and Agi Haiman took their cousin and my 
friend Juliet Kershaw and me to Budapest’s Statue Park. Unlike most 
other former Eastern bloc peoples, after the system change, the 
Hungarians did not smash the Communist era statues to smithereens 
(with the exception of a statue of Stalin that was smashed in the ’56 
revolution). Instead, they re-erected them in an “outdoor museum.” 
In July of 1989 the Hungarian literary historian László Szörényi 
suggested the creation of such a park to quell a debate over what to do 
with all the statues dating from the communist system, which fell in 
1989/90 (commentators [e.g., Bandy 2004] have noted that unlike the 
dramatic fall of the Berlin Wall, the so-called system change in Hungary 
wasn’t so much a fall as a deflation, much like what happens to a soufflé 
taken out of the oven too soon). So, in December of 1991, the Budapest 
Assembly issued a tender for “plans as to the future of the statues.” The 
Budapest architect Ákos Eleőd won, and the park, known in Hungarian 
as Szobor Park (simply Statue Park), was officially opened in the autumn 
of 1993 on a site about twenty minutes from central Budapest. At the 
official dedication early in ’94, the architect Eleőd had this to say: 
This park is a very delicate matter. I've been trying my utmost to treat this 
terribly serious theme with the proper amount of seriousness. But what is 
Truth? Of course, I can't answer that. But there's plenty of time to think about 
it. I had to realise that if I constructed this park with more tendentious, extreme 
or realistic methods — as a number of people were expecting — I would 
ultimately be doing nothing more than constructing my own anti-propaganda 
park from these propagandist statues, and following the same thought patterns 
and prescriptions of dictatorship that erected these statues in the first place.  
This park is about dictatorship. And at the same time, because it can be talked 
about, described, built, this park is about democracy. After all, only democracy is 
able to give the opportunity to let us think freely about dictatorship. Or about 
democracy. Or about anything. 
As we approached the Park on that grey December day, the steely gaze of 
Lenin met us from one side and that of Marx and Engels from the other 
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as loud speakers played martial music. Once past the entrance, one enters 
a space that contains about forty statues, plaques and murals laid out 
around a red star in three figure-eights. Statues include busts of former 
communist leaders, both international and local; big-calved workers 
with unnaturally large hands, all the better to bring in the sheaves with; 
and martyrs, all with heads uplifted, staring unblinkingly into the 
future. I am sure they never saw themselves ending up here.  
All photos © Juliet Kershaw 




Béla Kun was a Communist leader of the very short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic, the second 
Communist government in Europe after Russia, which ruled Hungary for 133 days in 1919. The 
story goes that, during WWII, Ostapenko and Steinmetz were two Red Army officers and truce-
bearers, who were brutally killed by the Nazis when they tried to negotiate a truce to save 
Budapest. After the war, the Communists erected statues to them to remind people of the perfidy of 
the Nazis and the sacrifice of the Soviets (Rév 2005, 248). As happens so commonly with official 
stories, irreverence poked its head through, and a popular Hungarian expression of the era became 
“when Ostapenko changes step” meaning something like “fat chance.” Both statues were blown up 
during the 1956 revolution, but were recast in 1958, and eventually moved to the Statue Park 
(Margolis 1998).  
 




I S N ’ T  I T  W E I R D  T H A T  T H E  W O R D S  C O N S U M E R I S M  
A N D  C O M M U N I S M  A R E  A L M O S T  A N A G R A M S  O F  E A C H  
O T H E R ?  
The Statue Park is owned by the City of Budapest but operated by a 
contracted private firm in an economic model well known in the West. 
The private entrepreneurs have established a small gift shop in the park 
that sells all manner of items. For example, the music that was playing 
when we entered the park was from a two-CD set entitled Communism’s 
Greatest Hits, which is available for purchase. Other selections from the 
CDs include such toe-tappers as “Weave Your Silk, Comrade” and the 
“Stalin Cantata.” (As an aside, I must point out that these communists 
were not the only ones with a musical bent. Years ago, I bought an album 
by the Communist Party of Canada–Marxist Leninist, and I still recall 
some of the tunes. One was a rather witty ditty about a drunk and 
spectacleless then Quebec premier Rene Levesque who ran over and 
killed a man on a Montreal street. The opening line was “Rene Levesque 
doesn’t wear his specs. Look out everybody!” Another tuneful number 
was “The Party Is the Most Precious Thing.”) 
The concession stand also sells t-shirts with anti-communist slogans, 
postcards, and memorabilia, such as candles, cigarette lighters 
emblazoned with Lenin’s memorable profile, and models of the Trabant, 
the infamous East German car. (The Trabant was made of duroplast, a 
kind of plastic reinforced with wool or cotton. Rumour has it that the 
plastic material of the Trabant is digestible by pigs, a rumour Kusturica 
plays with in a scene from Black Cat, White Cat.) The Park sells a poster 
with a picture of Lenin, Marx and Mao with a caption reading “The 
Three Terrors,” a play on “The Three Tenors,” as well as, in a triumph of 
kitsch, an empty tin can emblazoned with the words “The last gasp of 
communism.”   
 
W H O  W A S  I T  W H O  S A I D  –  “ T H O S E  W H O  F O R G E T  
H I S T O R Y … ”  I  F O R G E T  T H E  R E S T  O F  T H E  L I N E  
So what is going on with this Statue Park and its kitschy gift shop? Is the 
park meant to work as a cautionary tale? Pál Haiman, who is about 60, 
tells us that the park was erected so that Hungarian children could see 
what the older generation lived through and never repeat those mistakes. 
My friends with children tell me that it doesn’t really work that way. 
When I ask Evgenia Stoyanova, who grew up Bulgaria, if she thinks the 




park will help people remember history so as not to repeat it, she says, 
“No. But I’m Eastern European, and I see the glass half empty. Besides, if 
that was the idea, why aren’t the statues displayed downtown, like the 
statues commemorating WWII? Why are they are moved out of sight to 
the city outskirts?” 
I think it’s fair to say that the park arouses many different reactions, 
depending on the viewer. For me, an interested but distant observer of 
things Hungarian who grew up in the bubble-world known as Canada, 
the park was fascinating, strange and bit saddening. Lilla Sipos, a 
Hungarian scholar currently at the University of Alberta, was about 
fourteen when the park was erected, and she says of the park: “It was 
interesting to me because I had always seen those statues standing in the 
streets and park where I grew up. But my parents seemed to find them… 
amusing.” Pal Heiman sees nothing to laugh about; for him the Park is a 
reminder of a terrible time in Hungary’s history. Yet for others the 
statues arouse feelings of nostalgia for a time that was perhaps more 
secure and predictable, in contrast to the state of flux in which the 
country currently finds itself. The Hungarian economist Magdolna Csath 
writes: “In Hungary's transformation to capitalism, changes have been 
imposed on the people, who pay the price in job losses, high 
unemployment, lack of opportunities to live a decent life, poverty, and a 
growing gap between the new rich and the many poor. Hungarians are 
very cynical about the argument that, in spite of all the problems, they at 
least have democracy and a functioning market economy.… A general 
sentiment is that the system change only means that those who once had 
been devoted followers of Karl Marx have transformed themselves into 
neoliberal capitalists and kept all the capital for themselves” (Csath 
2004). Indeed, former Socialist Prime Minster Ferenc Gyurcsány is one 
the ten richest men in Hungary. Reportedly, when asked about the source 
of his wealth, he cryptically stated that “he was in the right place at the 
right time” (cited in Bandy, 2004). This recalls a conversation I had with 
a Budapest cab driver in 1992. “It used to be,” he said, “that we were 
poor but the government looked after us. Now we are still poor and 
nobody gives a shit.” 
This recalls the German term ostalgie (from ost for east and nostalgie 
for nostalgia), which refers to a longing for life in the former East 
Germany, particularly for the little things that disappeared after 
reunification. Indeed, some “businesses in Germany cater to those 
suffering from Ostalgie. Now available are obsolete brands of East 
German foodstuffs, old state television programmes on video and DVD, 




and the previously widespread Wartburg and Trabant cars” 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ostalgie). Ostalgie entered the global 
imaginary via, not Leander Haußmann’s 1999 Sonnenallee, which for 
many interesting reasons failed to catapult out of the national sphere, but 
Wolfgang Becker’s 2003 Goodbye Lenin, in which an enthusiastically 
committed socialist and single mother falls into a coma and misses the 
fall of the Wall. While she is unconscious, Coca-Cola capitalism arrives, 
her son falls in love her Russian nurse (Lara) and her daughter gets a 
mcjob at Burger King. Doctors warn that the shock of the GDR’s demise 
might kill her, so when she wakes up, they keep news of the reunification 
from her. To convince her that the old world is still in place, they buy 
unfashionable clothes, obtain increasingly hard-to-get old-regime 
brands of pickles, and shield her from things like the neighbour’s 
satellite TV, and in doing so, they create a facsimile of the old perfect 
order.  
 
D E - I D E - W H A T ?  
The Statue Park website says that the Park is unique in Central Europe, 
though there is such a park in Lithuania, and Moscow has its Park of the 
Arts, which Svetlana Boym discusses in The Future of Nostalgia. Unlike 
in Hungary, at the collapse of the Soviet Union people toppled statues as 
though they were chess pieces (as also occurred in Bulgaria, where, 
Evgenia and Ivanka Stoyanova tell me, “In the euphoria immediately 
after the resignation of our long-presiding dictator in 1989, most of the 
statues were pillaged. Some were melted to be used in new pieces, though 
this was actually quite rare because the municipalities didn’t have 
money for art; most of the statues were stolen by poor people who sold 
them for recycling. The situation in smaller towns — the stronghold of 
communist nomenklatura for years — was much different. The 
communist statues there lasted much longer. But now it’s a rarity to see 
one standing.”) Meanwhile back in Russia, Boym tells us that many of 
the downed Russian monuments, defaced and covered with graffiti, 
ended up in a park in Moscow where they were left to decay. Imagine her 
amazement, when, in 1997, she returned to Moscow to find the statues, 
including Dzerzhinsky, the head of the secret police, and Stalin, not only 
re-erected but standing in a park among on oddly disparate group of 
figures including Adam and Eve, Gandhi and Don Quixote. All the 
graffiti had been removed and the statues bore explanatory plaques with 
banal details as well as this piece of bureaucratese: “This monument has 




historical and artistic significance. The monument belongs to the 
memorial constructions of the politico-ideological thematics of the 
Soviet Union. Protected by the state.” This was not a totalitarian 
sculpture garden, writes Boym (2001, 84) “but something much more 
ordinary and pleasant. Such words as totalitarian were simply out of 
place here. The Park of Arts [featured] a path of roses and a cafeteria that 
sold Russian perogi under cheerful Coca Cola umbrellas.… The Park of 
Arts is about de-ideologization.” Boym suggests that perhaps Russian 
people are tired of symbolic battles and of new revelations of past Soviet 
atrocities. “If there is a nostalgia at the end of the millennium, it seems to 
be post-historical; it is a longing for a life of peace and plenty… the park 
succeeds in removing any trace of estrangement or ambiguous attitude 
toward the past. The place isn’t even particularly nostalgic, being 
beyond the dialectics of remembering and forgetting, history has become 
spatialized, the art of memory has turned into the art of leisure.” (91) 
I think it’s safe to say that Budapest’s Statue Park, which Istvan Rév 
refers to as the “ghetto of socialist memorials, where the dead sculptures 
await the last judgment” (2005, 273), is not an expression of de-
ideologization. Though architect Eleőd says that the Park is “about 
dictatorship, and democracy,” it is also about the ideological system 
that produced the park. That is, the grouping of the statues into a kind of 
petrified zoo, the music, and the kitschy souvenirs combine to serve the 
agenda of the anti-communist conservative governments that followed 
the 1990 defeat of the communist/socialists. Communism is made to 
seem preposterous, a “what was I thinking” minute that lasted for 
decades, and as we shall see, this conservative ideological thread winds 
its way all the way to the House of Terror. Walter Benjamin notably 
observed that the aura that surrounds a work of original is lost when the 
object is reproduced; though the statutes in the Statue Park are one-offs 
and not mass produced (although there is a decided sameness to the 
many busts of communist functionaries), nevertheless, the grouping of the 
statues in this “kind of statue concentration camp serves to remove their 
aura” (Anselmi 2005). And the tacky but prosperous little store selling 
trinkets (a bottle of air for 10 dollars US!?—at least the Italian artist 
Manzoni put excrement in his cans!) suggests that, in the case of the 
Hungarian consciousness, capitalism won a decided victory. In 
Retroactive Justice: Prehistory of Post Communism, Rév discusses how 
prevailing ideologies compete over myths and the power to interpret 
them, and he relates another version of the Ostapenko and Steinmetz 
story that surfaced after the system change. Before 1989, Ostapenko and 




Stienmetz were heroes and symbols of the friendship between Hungary 
and the then USSR. Since 1989, though, “a new anti-communist 
historiography” has suggested that the Soviets shot Ostapenko in the 
back by mistake while Steinmetz drove his car off the road while drunk 
and killed himself (Rév 2005, 129).  
So what has replaced the statues? A cynic would mention 
McDonald’s Golden Arches or KFC. Despite the obvious presence of such 
wonderful American cultural symbols, Budapest still has lots of 
political statues (of Kossuth, Petőfi and Széchenyi, for example) that 
stand the test of time because their subjects belong to a more distant, 
more heroic and unproblematic past. As well, other kinds of memorials 
have sprung up, notably to such figures as Raoul Wallenberg, the 
Swedish ambassador credited with saving anywhere between 20,000 
and 100,000 Hungarian Jews, and to victims of the Holocaust. Indeed 
Budapest’s synagogue, the largest in Europe, has a stupendous Holocaust 
memorial.  
 
B U D A P E S T ’ S  H O U S E  O F  T E R R O R :  T H E  S Z O B O R  P A R K ’ S  
T W I S T E D  S I S T E R  
Opened in 2002, the House of Terror is a museum dedicated to the past 
atrocities of both the fascists and the communists. It is located at 60 
Andrássy Boulevard, one of Budapest’s grandest streets and a UNESCO 
World Heritage site. The actual building at 60 Andrássy served as the 
headquarters for two brutal regimes: first for the Arrow Cross party, the 
extreme right-wing party that came to power in 1945 under the 
leadership of Szalási. Then, after the end of the war, for the communists, 
who deliberately chose the same building for the headquarters of the 
secret police (the AVO, renamed AVH).  
The House of Terror is completely grey. A black frame around the 
roof is decorated with the perforated words terror as well as an arrow 
cross, symbol of the fascists, and a star, a symbol of the communists. 
When the sun shines through the perforations, the word terror and the 
two symbols appear on the building’s walls. And, as though one were 
attending a theatrical performance, a limited number of visitors are 
allowed entry at one time; the influx is closely monitored by unfriendly 
guards. And the dual entry fee system is reminiscent of communist days 
— foreigners pay about $13 US to get in, twice as much as Hungarians. 
In the museum’s atrium stands a Soviet tank alongside a wall of 
portraits of some of the people killed in the building. Displays include 




scenes of gulag life, socialist realist art and a labyrinth of bricks made 
from pork fat, meant to remind people of the hard times of the 1950s 
(Steves 2005). As one descends in an elevator to the basement torture 
chambers, a lugubrious video explains how people were executed. In the 
final room, a TV shows recorded live coverage of the 1989 reburial of 
Imre Nagy, the leader after the ’56 revolution, who was executed by the 
communists, and a 1989 speech by the right-wing politician (and, to 
some, dangerous irredentist and anti-Semite) Viktor Orbán, ordering the 
Russians to leave Hungarian soil. Orbán was a founding member of 
Fidész (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége, the Alliance of Young Democrats), 
which he helped transform from an anti-communist student movement 
into a conservative party. Fidész gained power in 1998 under Orbán, 
who governed Hungary in coalition with the smaller Hungarian 
Democratic Forum until 2002, when the Socialist party won the election. 
Orbán was Prime Minister when the House was opened.  
At the Statue Park, monuments to a political era and ideology are 
displayed out of context: the viewer is therefore forced to reassess and 
reformulate their meaning but is also allowed some emotional distance. 
The kitschy humour serves to undercut much of the emotional impact. At 
the House of Terror, on the other hand, the house itself is the actual scene 
of terrible events, which included torture and show trials of Hungarian 
citizens. The names of actual people, some of them still living, are listed 
on the wall of perpetrators. There is no distance here between the viewer 
and the thing viewed, for the viewer is inside the belly of the beast itself, 
as it were. Further, the mediated images—that is, the videos and 
photographs, as well as the melodramatic soundtrack and the way 
visitors’ movements are almost choreographed—stimulate the senses not 
the mind, and in the words of Istvan Rev, arouse a “weird fascination” 
(293).  
This House has caused much controversy in Hungary. László Karsai, 
one of Hungary’s top Holocaust scholars, suggests that the creators of the 
House, working under the right-wing government of Viktor Orban, tried 
to draw a line between the communist torturers and left-of-centre 
politicians of the present. “The message is simple,” he notes, “Almost 
every Hungarian is innocent. The main guilty are foreign forces; first the 
Germans, then the Russians, then the very few collaborators. Therefore, 
today only a collaborator could vote for a socialist or a liberal” (as cited 
in Kim 2003).  




Rév (2005, 293) draws an eerie parallel between the House of Terror 
and the “Mostra della rivoluzione fascista,” the exhibit of the fascist 
revolution, opened in October 1932 by Mussolini, about which he writes:  
The distance between fact and fiction, construction and reconstruction, 
genuine historical documents and artistic re-creation disappeared. The 
ephemeral space swallowed up the viewers, who were denied the detachment 
needed for contemplation or just for understanding the sight. The ambition… 
was to build a total, self-contained environment, the apotheosis of the 
movement and of the Duce, that aimed at not the rational but the emotional 
reactions of the visitors, immersed in the flow of the unexpected visual and 
rhetorical impulses. (294) 
Two of the House’s rooms are dedicated to the fascist atrocities that 
killed over 600,000 Jewish, Roma and left-wing citizens of Hungary, 
while twenty-five rooms focus on the communist era, which is reported 
to have claimed 3000 victims. Notice that I did not write only 3000 — 
making such a distinction would be morally repugnant, but someone 
decided what to display in this House and how, so one is entitled to ask 
“who” and “why.”  
 
U N E A S Y  B E D F E L L O W S  
If, as the Hungarian novelist György Konrad wrote, “Faiths, myths and 
memory live side by side,” they do not do so easily. Instead they crash 
into each constantly, like bumper cars on a midway, especially in 
societies undergoing major transformations. As Hungary tries to get its 
footing in that great sorting mechanism known as the market economy, 
one hopes that its people can overcome divisive political polarization, 
which, since the system change, has seen it seesaw politically from right 
to left like a yoyo. The Hungarian winner of the 2002 Nobel Prize for 
literature, Imre Kertész, also sees the problematic effect of this simplistic 
approach to history: “After 1989, no one accepted that they made the 
choice to collaborate. Overnight everyone became a dissident. One lie 
replaced the other, and that's a problem all of Eastern Europe still has to 
deal with.” He goes on to say that, “The conflict not between nations but 
between rationalism and fanaticism, between cultures that cannot 
understand each other, is very, very dangerous.”  
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